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[283] 
Internalizing the External Costs of Medical 
Device Preemption 
By David Chang* 
Medical device preemption is highly controversial because it provides medical device 
companies with immunity from state tort claims. Congress provided medical device 
companies with preemption in 1976 because it was concerned that medical device 
companies were being overwhelmed by the costs of litigation. Congress feared that this 
was destroying the incentive for medical device companies to develop risky but 
innovative life-saving devices.  
 
Today, the dark side of medical device preemption has come to light. Medical device 
preemption fails to require medical device companies to account for harms that their 
products create for society. Medical device companies have been able to externalize the 
harms caused by their defective products. Many patients harmed by medical devices 
have been denied the opportunity to sue for redress. Further, medical device companies 
have been shielded from picking up the costs of their defective products. As a result, 
American taxpayers have been unfairly forced to pick up the tab.  
 
This Note argues that the United States government should force medical device 
companies to internalize some of the harms created by their products by creating a 
National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program modeled after the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The government should also create a National 
Medical Device Insurance Fund. These two programs would force medical device 
companies to internalize some of the costs of their defective medical devices and 
provide a remedy for patients harmed by medical devices. Further, these solutions 
would preserve the life-saving benefits of medical device innovation.  
 
 * J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. MBA, 
Thunderbird School of Global Management, 2009. B.S. Business Administration, Pepperdine 
University, 2004. I would like to thank Professor Jaime King for her guidance, advice, and comments 
on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Ben Buchwalter, Katelyn Keegan, and the entire Hastings 
Law Journal Notes team for their feedback and suggestions. This Note is dedicated to my loving 
parents Lee and Che, my wonderful sister Ellie, and all of the family, friends, and colleagues who have 
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7. Chang_15 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:22 PM 
284 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:283 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 284 
I.  The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 and Preemption ... 287 
A.  The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 .................. 287 
B.  Medical Device Preemption ................................................... 290 
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Parallel Claims and Section 
510(k) Devices ..................................................................... 291 
2. Rigel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Non-Parallel Claims and 
Premarket Approval ............................................................ 293 
3. Medical Device Preemption after Lohr and Riegel .......... 294 
4. The Lower Courts’ Interpretations After Lohr and 
Riegel .................................................................................... 294 
C.  Policy Issues with Medical Device Preemption ................ 295 
1. Medical Device Innovation ................................................. 295 
2. Opponents of Riegel and the Legislative Response ......... 296 
II.  The Economics of Preemption ............................................................ 297 
A. Defining Externality ............................................................. 298 
B.  Internalizing Externalities ................................................. 299 
C.  The Cost of the Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall on 
Medicare ................................................................................... 300 
III.  The Impact of Medical Device Preemption .................................... 302 
IV.  Internalizing the Externalities of Medical Device 
Preemption ........................................................................................ 304 
A.  Creating a “National Medical Device Injury 
Compensation Program” ......................................................... 304 
B.  Medical Device Companies Should Be Required to 




Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that 
benefits the American public, and one important way for the government 
to achieve this goal is to protect medical device companies from 
unnecessary litigation. Without such protection, there is a strong 
likelihood that medical device companies would succumb to the high 
costs of litigation or be disincentivized from continuing to do business in 
the medical device market. This Note argues that the United States 
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government should develop a legal framework for medical device 
companies that would properly compensate harmed patients while 
preserving the life-saving benefits of device innovation. The creation of a 
new National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program and 
National Medical Device Insurance Fund would force device companies 
to internalize some of the costs of medical device defects that have 
historically been externalized by medical device preemption but preserve 
the benefits of medical device innovation. 
Medical device defects can have broad social and financial 
implications for governments. In 2010, a public health crisis regarding 
silicone breast implants struck France. An unusually large percentage of 
women fitted with silicone breast implants made by Poly Implant 
Prothèse (“PIP”), a small French medical device company, experienced 
serious ruptures and leakages with their implants.1 More than 1500 of the 
estimated 30,000 French women fitted with PIP implants experienced 
these serious ruptures.2 This rupture rate doubled the industry average.3 
After an investigation, French authorities discovered that PIP cut 
costs over the previous decade by using a grade of industrial silicone gel 
in its breast implants that was unapproved for medical use.4 The lower 
graded industrial silicone cost the company a mere fraction of the price 
of medical-grade silicone typically used in other breast implants.5 In an 
interview with French police, Jean-Claude Mas, the owner of PIP, 
admitted to deceiving European safety inspectors for thirteen years.6 
French authorities shut down PIP in March of 2010.7 
Health concerns over PIP’s implants further increased when a PIP 
silicone breast implant recipient died in November 2010 from a rare 
cancer called anaplastic large-cell lymphoma after her implant ruptured.8 
The French media reported that she was the eighth woman with a PIP 
implant to have died of cancer.9 Although the cause of the deaths 
remained uncertain, the news alarmed French and European health 
 
 1. David Jolly & Maïa de la Baume, France Recommends Removal of Suspect Breast Implants, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2011, at A6. 
 2. Id.; Maïa de la Baume, Frenchwomen Worry About Suspect Breast Implants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
17, 2012, at A11 [hereinafter Frenchwomen Worry]. 
 3. Maïa de la Baume & David Jolly, Health Fears Over Suspect French Breast Implants Spread 
Abroad, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2011, at A6.  
 4. Bryony Jones, Breast Implant Scandal: What Went Wrong?, CNN (Jan. 27, 2012, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/europe/pip-breast-implant-scandal-explained. 
 5. Id. 
 6. PIP Breast Implant Boss Jean-Claude Mas Faces Charges, BBC (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16736385. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2. 
 9. Jolly & de la Baume, supra note 1. 
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authorities.10 By late December 2011, the unusually high number of 
ruptures led French health authorities to recommend that women with 
silicone breast implants made by PIP have their implants removed.11 
Unfortunately, the scope of the silicone breast implant crisis extended 
well beyond the borders of France. PIP sold more than eighty percent of 
its silicone breast implants outside of France.12 Some 300,000 women in 
sixty-five countries, including the United States, received implants made 
by PIP.13 Without the now-defunct PIP to absorb the costs of removing 
the implants and compensate patient losses, the French government 
agreed to cover the cost of removing the PIP silicone breast implants.14 
The French national healthcare system estimated that it would cost 
approximately 60 million Euros, or about 77 million U.S. Dollars, to treat 
the 30,000 French women with PIP implants.15 
Many countries chose to follow France’s lead and absorb the costs 
of replacing PIP implants. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff ordered 
Brazil’s public health system to pay for the removal of ruptured breast 
implants.16 This came at a significant cost to the Brazilian government as 
more than 25,000 Brazilian women received PIP silicone breast 
implants.17 Other countries that agreed to cover the full cost of removing 
the implants included the United Kingdom and Venezuela.18 
Medical device preemption could leave the United States government 
and the public on the hook for the costs associated with a medical device 
catastrophe similar to France’s. With medical device companies immune 
from having to provide redress because of medical device preemption, 
the United States would likely have to follow the actions of countries like 
France and Brazil and cover the medical costs of patients harmed by 
medical devices. 
The global medical device industry is worth $300 billion dollars.19 
The United States, the world’s largest medical devices market, comprises 
about one-third of the global medical device market.20 The United States 
government should not be forced to internalize the full costs of a medical 
 
 10. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2.  
 11. Id. 
 12. De la Baum & Jolly, supra note 3. 
 13. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2. 
 14. Jones, supra note 4, at 3. 
 15. David Jolly & Maïa de la Baume, British Seek Data on Suspect Breast Implants, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 4, 2012, at A9. 
 16. Brazil: Government Will Pay to Replace Ruptured Implants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2012, at A9. 
 17. Id; see Jolly & de la Baume, supra note 1. 
 18. Q&A: PIP breast implants health scare, BBC (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:45 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16391522. 
 19. Zacks Equity Research, Industry Outlook, Zacks Inv. Research (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/50398/medical-devices-industry-outlook-%96-april-2011. 
 20. Id. 
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device company’s defects. Medical device recalls are common. The Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) website lists more than 160 Class I 
medical device (the type that receives medical device preemption) recalls 
in 2009 alone.21 Forcing the government to shoulder the full cost of device 
defects creates a significant cost for taxpayers. 
This Note argues that the United States government should 
implement a National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program and 
National Medical Device Insurance Fund. The development of these two 
programs would balance the need to properly compensate harmed patients 
and preserve the benefits of medical device innovation. Part I examines 
the Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976. This Part analyzes which 
types of medical devices are entitled to preemption, examines the policy 
concerns associated with medical device preemption, and discusses the 
benefits of medical device innovation. Part II analyzes the economics of 
medical device preemption by looking at some of the costs of medical 
device preemption that have been borne by the government. Part III 
discusses the benefits of medical device preemption and considers whether 
the benefits of medical device preemption are worth the cost. Part IV 
proposes the creation of a National Medical Device Injury Compensation 
Program and National Medical Device Insurance Fund to provide redress 
for patients who have been harmed while preserving the financial ability of 
medical device companies to engage in medical device innovation. 
I.  The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 and Preemption 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a medical device as an 
instrument that is intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, treatment, or 
prevention of disease.22 A medical device differs from medicine because 
it “does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical 
action within or on the body.”23 Under the Medical Device Act 
Amendments of 1976 (the “MDAA”), many state tort claims against 
medical device manufacturers are preempted because the claims are 
considered prohibited by the MDAA. Understanding what types of state 
tort claims are preempted begins with an analysis of the MDAA. 
A.  The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 
The MDAA established the regulatory system for medical devices.24 
The MDAA requires the FDA to approve medical devices before they 
 
 21. H. Dennis Tolley, Examining the Sprint Fidelis Effect on Medicare Costs 2 (2010). 
 22. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 321(h)(2) (2012). For further discussion of the 
definition of medical devices, see infra Part I.A. 
 23. Id. § 321(h). 
 24. Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
7. Chang_15 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:22 PM 
288 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:283 
 
may be marketed to the general public.25 For approval processing, the 
FDA classifies medical devices into three separate categories: Class I, 
Class II, and Class III.26 
Class I medical devices are “subject only to minimal regulation by 
‘general controls’”27 because “[t]hese devices present minimal potential for 
harm to the user and are often simpler in design than Class II or Class III 
devices.”28 Examples of Class I medical device products include enema 
kits and elastic bandages.29 Forty-seven percent of all medical devices are 
classified as Class I,30 and ninety-five percent of those medical devices are 
exempt from the regulatory process.31 For exempt devices (such as 
stethoscopes, thermometers, and bedpans), manufacturers are only 
required to register and list devices with the FDA prior to marketing.32 
Class II medical devices require manufacturers to comply with 
“special controls” such as performance standards and post-market 
surveillance measures.33 If these controls are met, the manufacturer may 
market these products without further approval.34 Class II medical 
devices include powered wheelchairs and pregnancy test kits.35 Forty-
three percent of medical devices fall into this category.36 
Manufacturers of Class III medical devices must provide the FDA 
with a “reasonable assurance” that their medical device is safe.37 The 
manufacturer is required to provide the FDA with all data on the medical 
device product’s safety, efficacy, and a proposed label.38 Class III medical 
devices “usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or present 
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”39 Examples of Class III 
 
 25. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)). 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012); see also Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Claims: A Survival Kit for the Trenches, Ann. 2008 AAJ-CLE 913 (2008). 
 27. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996). 
 28. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin. (Apr. 21, 2009) http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ 
ucm142523.htm. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316–17 (2008). 
 34. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996); see also Class I/II Exemptions, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm. 
 35. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared, supra note 28. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(B). 
 38. Premarket Approval Application (“PMA”), 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2006); see Martin v. 
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 39. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared, supra note 28. 
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medical devices include implantable pacemakers and breast implants.40 
Ten percent of all medical devices fall under this category.41 Most 
medical device litigation occurs with Class III medical devices.42 
Prior to receiving marketing approval, the average Class III product 
requires 1200 hours of testing.43 Because of this stringent premarketing 
approval requirement, most manufacturers of Class III medical devices 
attempt to market their products by qualifying under an exception to the 
FDA’s premarket approval requirement.44 
Once a Class III medical device has received premarket approval, the 
manufacturer is forbidden from making changes to the device’s “design 
specifications, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, 
that would affect safety or effectiveness” without permission from the 
FDA.45 To make a change, the manufacturer must submit an application 
for supplementary premarket approval.46 The supplementary preapproval 
process is evaluated under a process similar to the initial application 
itself.47 
There are two major exceptions to the FDA’s premarket approval 
requirements.48 The first major exception is the “grandfathering” 
provision.49 If a device was on the market before May 1976, the MDAA 
allows the device to be marketed without FDA approval.50 The second 
major exception to the FDA’s premarket approval requirements is the 
section 501(k) process.51 The section 510(k) process allows devices that 
are “substantially equivalent” to existing approved devices to undergo an 
expedited approval.52 The section 510(k) process focuses on the similarity, 
or equivalence, between the new device and the pre-existing device.53 
Thus, the section 510(k) process can usually be completed in an average 
of twenty hours and not the usual 1200 hours required by the FDA’s 
premarketing approval process.54 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Christopher R. Pace, 4 Views On Medical Device Preemption, Law360 (Mar. 24, 
2011), http://law360.com/articles/233823/print?section=appellate. 
 43. Id. at 477. 
 44. Id. at 478–79. 
 45. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319 (2008) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i) (2012)). 
 46. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–78 (1996) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A); 
21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1) (1995)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478. 
 54. Id. at 479. 
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The majority of Class III medical devices are approved for 
marketing by way of the section 510(k) process.55 In 2005, the FDA 
approved 3148 devices under the section 510(k) process.56 That same 
year, the FDA approved only thirty-two devices via the premarket 
approval process.57 PIP received section 510(k) approval for its saline 
implants from the FDA in September 1996.58 
In addition to determining which products enter the market, these 
standards may also determine whether an injured person can recover 
damages if harmed. Under the MDAA, the FDA’s premarket approval 
allows medical device manufactures to become practically immune from 
state tort claims. Premarket approval by the FDA has often preempted 
state tort claims against medical device manufacturers and shielded 
medical device companies from liabilities that arise from product defects. 
Since medical device companies are shielded from liabilities, injured 
individuals often seek out other entities to redress harms caused by the 
medical devices—frequently the Government. This allows the medical 
device companies to externalize the costs of the harm caused by their 
products. 
B. Medical Device Preemption 
Preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 
which provides that the Constitution and the laws made pursuant to the 
Constitution are the supreme law of the land.59 The Supreme Court in 
Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association declared that 
“under the Supremacy Clause . . . any state law, however clearly within a 
State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to 
federal law, must yield.”60  
When a statutory provision expressly preempts state law, the court 
must look to the text of the preemption statute and “identify the domain 
expressly pre-empted” by the language of the statutory provision.61 Here, 
 
 55. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-808, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305); see 
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 56. See Peter B. Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law 992 (3d ed. 2007). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Breast Implant Safety: FDA Warned Poly Implant Prothese About Issues In 2000, Huffington 
Post (Dec. 27, 2011, 12:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/27/breast-implant-safety-
pip_n_1170537.html. 
 59.  U.S. Const. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 60. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (“[E]ven state regulation 
designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation.”). 
 61. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
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the MDAA includes a preemption clause, so a court would first have to 
determine its scope. 
The enactment of the MDAA triggered a great debate as to whether 
state tort claims (such as negligence, strict liability, and implied 
warranty) against medical device manufacturers are preempted by the 
FDA’s premarketing approval process. The Medical Device Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 360k, states: 
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue 
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any 
requirement— 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under 
this chapter.62 
The Medical Device Act did not clarify the types of medical devices 
bound by the Act, and the Act left companies and attorneys unsure as to 
the types of devices that were covered by the Act. The Supreme Court 
addressed the scope of 21 U.S.C. § 360k and attempted to clarify which 
types of medical devices were covered by preemption in Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.63 
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Parallel Claims and Section 510(k) 
Devices 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme Court held that state law 
claims that parallel federal claims were not preempted.64 In 1987, Lora 
Lohr had a pacemaker equipped with a Medtronic Model 4011 
pacemaker lead implanted.65 The lead had been approved through a 
section 510k process by demonstrating that it was “substantially 
equivalent” to other products on the market.66 In 1990, Lohr’s pacemaker 
failed and caused a “complete heart block” that required emergency 
surgery.67 The suspected cause of the pacemaker’s failure was 
Medtronic’s Model 4011 lead.68 Lohr brought an action in Florida state 
court against Medtronic for state law claims of negligence and strict 
 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2011). 
 63. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the analysis provided by 
Lohr and Riegel). See generally Lohr, 518 U.S. 470; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 64. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495. 
 65. Id. Pacemaker leads are the wires that conduct electrical signals to and from the pacemaker to 
the heart. Cleveland Clinic, Lead Placement for Defibrillator or Pacemaker Devices, available at 
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/heart/percutaneous/percutaneousDevice.aspx. 
 66. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495. 
 67. Id. at 480–81. 
 68. Id. at 481. 
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liability.69 Lohr’s negligence claim alleged that Medtronic had breached its 
“duty to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and 
sale of the subject pacemaker” through its use of defective materials that 
may have caused the pacemaker to fail.70 Lohr’s strict liability count 
alleged that the pacemaker “was in a defective condition and unreasonably 
dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale.”71 
The Supreme Court determined that the Medical Device Act did 
not preempt Lohr’s state claims because they ran parallel to federal 
requirements and were not in addition to any federal requirements.72 The 
Court explained: 
Nothing in § 360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional 
damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those 
duties parallel federal requirements. Even if it may be necessary as a 
matter of Florida law to prove that those violations were the result of 
negligent conduct, or that they created an unreasonable hazard for 
users of the product, such additional elements of the state-law cause of 
action would make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than 
the federal requirement. While such a narrower requirement might be 
“different from” the federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference 
would surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption of a 
state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule. The presence of a 
damages remedy does not amount to the additional or different 
“requirement” that is necessary under the statute; rather, it merely 
provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical 
existing “requirements” under federal law.73 
The Court concluded that section 360k of the Medical Device Act 
does not preempt state laws that are identical to federal laws.74 The Lohr 
Court reasoned that the device in question, Medtronic’s pacemaker and 
the pacemaker lead, had gone through the section 510(k) “substantially 
equivalent” exemption and not the Food and Drug Administration’s 
more strenuous section 360k premarketing approval process.75 The Court 
held that section 510(k)’s generally applicable standards were not 
“requirements” under section 360k of the Medical Device Act and were 
therefore not sufficient to trigger preemption.76 
While the Lohr Court addressed the issue of preemption for 
section 510(k) “substantially equivalent” medical devices, the Court did 
not address whether the law preempts claims arising from defects in 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 493–95. 
 73. Id. at 495. 
 74. Id. at 494–95. 
 75. Id. at 494. 
 76. Id. at 492–93. 
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medical devices that had successfully gone through the FDA’s more 
stringent § 360k premarketing approval process.77 This question was later 
addressed in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.78 
2. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Non-Parallel Claims and Premarket 
Approval 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether 
section 360k of the MDAA barred state law claims challenging the safety 
and effectiveness of a medical device that had received premarket 
approval from the FDA.79 During Charles Riegel’s heart surgery, a balloon 
catheter that had been inserted into his coronary artery exploded, causing 
blockage in his heart.80 Riegel was immediately placed on life support and 
underwent emergency bypass surgery.81 Charles and Donna Riegel sued 
the manufacturer of the balloon catheter used in Riegel’s angioplasty. 
The Riegels asserted New York state law claims that included strict 
liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence in design, testing, 
inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, sale, and manufacture.82 The 
Riegels’ complaint alleged that the catheter had been designed, labeled, 
and manufactured in a manner that violated New York state law and that 
these violations caused Riegel’s injuries.83 
The Supreme Court held that the Medical Device Act’s preemption 
clause did preempt the Riegels’ tort claims challenging the safety and 
efficacy of premarket approved medical devices because the New York 
state laws imposed requirements that were “different from, or in addition 
to” federal ones.84 The Court noted that the FDA’s premarket approval 
process was a “rigorous” and time-intensive process that requires the FDA 
to reasonably assure the medical device’s “safety and effectiveness.”85 The 
Court determined that “the attributes that Lohr found lacking in section 
510(k) review are present here.”86 
The Court found that New York’s negligence and strict liability laws 
included requirements that may differ or complement those imposed by 
federal law.87 “[T]he state tort law underlying the Riegels’ claims would 
require a manufacturer’s device to be safer (but perhaps less effective) 
 
 77. Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26. 
 78. 552 U.S. 312 (2008) 
 79. Id. at 315. 
 80. Id. at 320. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 322. 
 85. Id. at 317–18. 
 86. Id. at 323. 
 87. Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26. 
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than the model device approved by the FDA, those requirements would 
‘disrupt[] the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same 
effect.’”88 Thus, the Court found that New York’s state requirements were 
not parallel to the federal requirements of the Medical Device Act and 
were preempted under section 360k.89 
3. Medical Device Preemption after Lohr and Riegel 
After Lohr, claims regarding Class III section 510(k)-approved 
devices are not preempted and are subject to state tort claims.90 Although 
the majority of Class III medical devices are approved for marketing 
through the section 510(k) process,91 many Class III section 360k devices 
still enter the market each year.92 After Riegel, these section 360k-
approved devices are entitled to preemption and are not open to state 
tort claims.93 These section 360k-approved devices are subject to most of 
the medical device preemption controversy. 
The section 510(k) approval process is based on pre-existing 
devices.94 Thus, these devices have been previously tested and have a 
history of product safety.95 Section 360k devices are the newest and most 
untested devices on the market. Thus, the most untested devices receive 
medical device preemption from state law tort claims. 
4. The Lower Courts’ Interpretations After Lohr and Riegel 
After Lohr and Riegel, courts have generally followed a three-step 
process to determine if a state tort claim is preempted: (1) identify the 
conduct that allegedly provides the right to damages under state law; 
(2) determine if that conduct is prohibited by the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (if the conduct is not prohibited under the act, the claim is 
expressly prohibited under section 360k(a)); and (3) determine if that 
conduct would give rise to liability under state law even if the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act had never been enacted; if not, it is likely that 
the claim is impliedly preempted.96 
The lower courts have been divided as to the application of the 
second prong of the test.97 If the conduct is not prohibited by the Food, 
 
 88. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492–94 (1996). 
 91. See id. at 479 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-808, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305); 
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 92. Hutt et al., supra note 56, at 992. 
 93. Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008). 
 94. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478. 
 95. Id. at 493–94. 
 96. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776–77 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 97. 2 James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration § 26:63 (3d ed. 2012). 
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the claim can be considered parallel and is not 
expressly prohibited under section 360k(a).98 If the conduct is prohibited 
by the Act, however, the claim is preempted under section 360k(a).99 
Courts have also differed as to what constitutes a “parallel claim.” Neither 
Lohr nor Riegel provides much guidance as to what constitutes a parallel 
claim, so the district courts have largely defined what constitutes a parallel 
claim on their own.100 
C. Policy Issues with Medical Device Preemption 
Legal scholars and legislators have long debated whether medical 
device preemption should exist. Supporters of preemption argue that it is 
necessary to encourage medical device innovation.101 Opponents counter 
that after Riegel, manufacturers of dangerous medical devices are 
practically immune from lawsuits initiated by victims who have been 
injured by the manufacturers’ devices.102 Those against preemption 
continually try to eliminate preemption through legislative means. This 
Part first discusses the primary benefit of medical device preemption—
innovation. Next, this Part discusses the opponents of preemption and 
their legislative efforts to eliminate medical device preemption. 
1. Medical Device Innovation 
Proponents of preemption argue that subjecting medical device 
manufacturers to tort litigation imposes high levels of regulatory and 
litigation risk. Proponents assert that the threat of litigation discourages 
investors from providing the capital necessary to develop and manufacture 
life-saving medical devices. Legislation that eliminates medical device 
preemption would “impair the health and lead to the death of 
Americans.”103 The establishment of a uniform set of rules to promote 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 
2009) (“The contours of the parallel claim exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-
defined.”); Prudhel v. Endologix, No. S-09-0661, 2009 WL 2045559, at *6, *9 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) 
(“Districts courts have divided on what constitutes a ‘parallel claim’ under Riegel” and “[c]ourts are 
further divided as to what Twombly requires of a plaintiff seeking to plead a parallel claim.”); White v. 
Stryker, 818 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (“[W]hile establishing a framework for . . . 
preemption, Riegel also raised many new questions.”). 
 101. See Hans A. von Spakovsky, Killing Americans by Stifling Medical Innovation: The Medical 
Device “Safety” Act of 2009, 46 Legal Memorandum, Aug. 4, 2009, at 5. 
 102. See generally Demetria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy: 
Salvaging Due Process for Injured Patients, 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 452 (2011). 
 103. von Spakovsky, supra note 101, at 1. 
7. Chang_15 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:22 PM 
296 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:283 
 
medical device innovation, as the Food and Drug Administration did via the 
MDAA, has been important to the development of new medical devices.104 
Proponents of preemption argue that medical device preemption 
increases stability by encouraging investors who are weary of the risks 
associated with products liability litigation. Hans von Spakovsky of the 
Heritage Foundation writes that “[t]his uniformity is the result of federal 
preemption and a federal regulatory system administered through the 
FDA that protects the health and safety of the public while allowing 
innovation and providing incentives for investors to fund the huge 
development costs.”105 Investors are encouraged to support the 
development of new medical devices because their investments will not be 
subject to reduced returns as a result of litigation costs. Additionally, 
reduced litigation against medical device companies encourages 
innovation because these companies can pursue the development of new 
and potentially life-saving products without the risk that these products 
will be subject to litigation if something goes wrong. 
In Riegel, Justice Scalia acknowledged Congress’ concern that 
permitting state tort claims against manufacturers for FDA-approved 
devices might stifle innovation.106 Justice Scalia wrote that Congress 
considered “those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries 
were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 states to all innovations.”107 This 
factor contributed to the Court’s final decision to uphold preemption.108 
However, not all of the Justices shared this concern. In his 
concurrence, Justice Stevens cautioned against the idea that tort 
remedies stifled the innovation and development of medical devices.109 
Justice Stevens stated “[t]hat is a policy argument advanced by the 
Court, not by Congress.”110 Justice Stevens found no evidence in the pre-
enactment history of the Medical Device Act to suggest that Congress 
believed that state tort remedies would impede future medical device 
development.111 The Supreme Court remains divided on the question of 
whether preemption actually promotes medical device innovation. 
2. Opponents of Riegel and the Legislative Response 
Opponents of medical device preemption assert that medical device 
companies are receiving a free pass from state tort violations as a result 
 
 104. Id. at 3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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of preemption. Analyzing Riegel, Judge Brody of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote that Riegel is 
“loud and clear: if a manufacturer complies with the premarket approval, 
it gets a free pass on those two claims. No state common-law claim can 
survive if it allows a claimant to proceed without showing a departure from 
federal standards. There simply is no wiggle room to find otherwise.”112 
Opponents of medical device preemption have attempted to remedy 
this “free pass” through legislative attempts to change section 360k of the 
Medical Device Amendments. 
Since the Riegel decision in 2008, Congress repeatedly introduced 
legislation to amend section 360k of the Medical Device Safety Act of 
1976, without success.113 In April of 2008, Senator Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts introduced the Medical Device Safety Act.114 This act 
attempted to bring medical device preemption back to the pre-Riegel 
standard by amending section 360k so that it could not be interpreted to 
preempt state law claims.115 The bill died when it was referred to 
Committee.116 The 111th Congress reintroduced the bill as the Medical 
Device Safety Act of 2009.117 This bill also died in Committee.118 To date, 
no proposed amendments to section 360k of the Medical Device Safety 
Act of 1976 have passed Congress. However, the economics of preemption 
make it likely that Congress will revisit efforts to amend § 360k. 
The legislature and judiciary must address medical device preemption 
because the outcome could decide whether individuals harmed by medical 
devices are entitled to partial or total compensation for their injuries. To 
properly answer this question, courts must evaluate the benefits and 
consequences of medical device preemption. In making a cost-benefit 
analysis, it is important to first consider the economics of preemption. 
II.  The Economics of Preemption 
Externalities are costs or benefits from an economic activity that 
impact parties outside of those engaged in the actual transaction.119 The 
central goal of tort law is to impose liability on the party or parties that 
 
 112. Williams v. Cyberonics, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 169 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 113. See Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).; Medical 
Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 114. H.R. 6381. 
 115. See Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26. 
 116. H.R. 6381. 
 117. H.R. 1346. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Matthew Bishop, Economics A-Z terms beginning with E, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/e (“Externality”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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are responsible for causing the harm.120 This operates as a way to 
internalize harmful externalities to the parties that cause the injury.121  
Harmful externalities arise when injurers do not account for the loss 
that they inflict on others as a result of their actions.122 The injuring party 
does not have to account for the harm because they do not suffer any 
consequences.123 This distorts economic resources and leads to economic 
inefficiency.124 Internalizing the externality, on the other hand, ensures 
that the perpetrators of the harm are suffering the consequences.125 In 
tort law, internalizing the externality is a way to prevent or deter harmful 
actions from occurring.126 
This Part first defines the term externality and then reviews the 
concept of internalizing externalities. This Part concludes with a look at 
how the costs of the Sprint Fidelis Lead failure were externalized to the 
United States government. 
A. Defining Externality 
Externalities “are costs or benefits arising from an economic activity 
that affect somebody other than the people engaged in the economic 
activity and are not reflected fully in prices.”127 Classic examples of 
externalities include air pollution from fossil fuels damaging public 
health128 and bees kept to produce honey pollinating plants belonging to 
a nearby farmer, thus boosting that farmer’s crop.129 In the air pollution 
example, the public suffers health consequences without any of the 
economic benefits that are enjoyed by the producer of the pollution. In 
the bee example, the farmer benefits from the bees pollinating her crops 
but experiences none of the costs of maintaining the bees. 
 
 120. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost, 
17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 589, 589 (1997). 
 121. Id.; see Tibor Scitovsky, The Concept of External Economics, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 143 (1954), 
reprinted in Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy 77 (Robert J. Staaf & 
Francis X. Tannian eds., Dunellen 1973) (noting the concept of externalities is “one of the most 
elusive in economic literature” because it can be defined in many ways); William J. Baumol & 
Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy 15–18 (2d ed. 1988). 
 122. Gilead, supra note 120, at 589. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 589–90. 
 126. Id.; see Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 30 (2011); 
David Partlett, Economic Analysis and Some Problems in the Law of Torts, 13 Melb. U. L. Rev. 398, 
401 (1982). 
 127. Bishop, supra note 119 (emphasis omitted). 
 128. Other Impacts: Ecosystems and Biodiversity, in European Comm’n Publ’ns Office, Extern 
E: Externalities of Energy: Methodology 2005 Update 229–237 (Peter Bickel & Rainer Friedrich 
eds., 2004). 
 129. See Bishop, supra note 119. 
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Here, medical device preemption externalizes the harms produced 
by medical devices from the manufacturers to the government and 
general public. When medical devices fail, like in the case of the 
pacemaker lead in Lohr or the balloon catheter in Riegel, serious 
consequences result. Great harm and costs can be borne by the 
government and general public if these harms are not internalized by the 
medical device companies themselves. 
B. Internalizing Externalities 
Courts have generally required businesses to absorb all the harms 
and costs associated with production.130 Courts have applied this concept 
in determining liability.131 A.C. Pigou, a leading early twentieth century 
economist, labeled this general economic principle as “internalization.”132 
Under Pigou’s principle of internalization, firms must pay for all of 
the costs associated with production.133 If firms do not, the market prices 
of their goods will become distorted and not reflect the true cost and use 
of resources that were necessary to produce the goods.134 Thus, some 
goods would be overpriced while others would be underpriced.135 The 
following example illustrates this concept of market inefficiency: 
[S]uppose that in the course of production a firm pollutes an adjacent 
river which has the effect of increasing the costs of production to a 
farmer downstream. If the firm is not forced to pay for those increased 
costs, then the farmer must absorb them. Due to these higher costs the 
farmer will have to charge higher prices in order to produce the same 
level of output as he did before the pollution. Because of these higher 
prices, however, consumers will purchase less of the farmer’s goods 
than they did previously. A new equilibrium for the farmer can be 
achieved only at higher prices and lower levels of production. At the 
same time, since the firm is not required to absorb its pollution costs, it 
will have lower costs of production and thus will be able to charge 
lower prices to produce the same level of output. Because of these 
lower prices consumers are willing to purchase more of the firm’s 
goods. The firm’s equilibrium will consist of lower prices and greater 
output when it does not pay for the pollution effects as compared with 
when it does.136 
In the example above, the economics of the marketplace have been 
distorted. The firm has externalized the costs of the pollution to the 
 
 130. Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 577, 
580 (1987). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 580. See generally A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed. 1932). 
 133. See White, supra note 130, at 580. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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disadvantage of the farmer, who is forced to bear the burden of the firm’s 
pollution. The firm can now charge a lower price for its products and sell 
more products, while the farmer has to charge a higher price and sell 
fewer products. This encourages the firm to continue to pollute the river 
to the detriment of the farmer. Pigou argues that this distortion of the 
marketplace is economically inefficient.137 
Here, similar to the example of the firm and farmer, the danger of 
medical device preemption is that it fails to require medical device 
companies to account for the harms to society that are produced by their 
products. Permitting medical device manufacturers to externalize the 
harms that are produced by their devices promotes poor corporate 
behavior and fails to force companies to act quickly and appropriately 
when their products harm consumers. Companies have no economic 
incentive to be good corporate citizens because they suffer no 
consequences if they fail to act in a responsible manner. The case of 
Medtronic, Inc.’s Sprint Fidelis Lead exemplifies this scenario. 
C. The Cost of the Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall on Medicare 
In re Medtronic Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation 
illustrates the economic and societal damages that arise when the company 
causing harm does not suffer the consequences of that harm.138 Anna 
Bryant and other patients sued Medtronic in 2007 after the company 
announced a recall of its defective Sprint Fidelis lead.139 The Sprint Fidelis 
Lead is a wire that allowed cardiac defibrillators to detect abnormal heart 
rhythms.140 When abnormal heart rhythms occurred, the Sprint Fidelis 
Lead delivered a shock to help the heart return to its normal rhythm.141 
The patients asserted twenty state law tort and breach of warranty claims 
for injuries allegedly caused by Medtronic’s defective leads.142 Applying 
the preemption principle from Riegel that medical devices receiving 
premarket approval from the FDA are entitled to preemption, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the MDAA preempted the patient’s claims.143 Thus, the 
court affirmed Medtronic’s motion to dismiss.144 
Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Lead is a Class III medical device.145 In 
December 1993, the FDA granted Medtronic Inc. premarket approval 
 
 137. Id. at 580–81. 
 138. 623 F. 3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 139. Id. at 1203. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1209. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1203. 
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for the Transvene Lead System.146 In June 2004, the FDA approved a 
premarket approval supplement for the Sprint Fidelis Lead.147  
Shortly after the Sprint Fidelis lead entered the market, patients 
implanted with the Sprint Fidelis device began experiencing unnecessary 
shocks.148 An investigation by Dr. Robert G. Hauser and the Minneapolis 
Heart Institute discovered that the Sprint Fidelis Leads fractured more 
frequently than other types of leads.149 Dr. Hauser and his colleagues 
published a “report finding that the Sprint Fidelis Lead was more likely 
to fracture than other types of leads, met with Medtronic to voice their 
concerns, and advised the FDA of those concerns.”150 Despite receiving 
this information from the Minneapolis Heart Institute, Medtronic 
vigorously defended its product and assured doctors that the Sprint Fidelis 
Lead was safe.151 Medtronic sent a “Dear Doctor” letter to physicians and 
other medical practitioners defending the safety of the Sprint Fidelis 
Lead.152 Medtronic asserted that the fractures were a result of improper 
surgical technique and assured physicians that the Sprint Fidelis Lead 
was as safe as other Medtronic leads.153 
In May 2007, Medtronic filed for a premarket approval (“PMA”) 
supplement for its Sprint Fidelis Lead.154 Medtronic sought FDA approval 
for design and manufacturing changes to the Sprint Fidelis Leads.155 The 
plaintiffs in Sprint Fidelis Leads asserted that Medtronic did this without 
advising the FDA about the high rate of failures experienced by patients 
with the Sprint Fidelis Lead.156 Medtronic’s PMA supplement for its 
Sprint Fidelis Lead was approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
in July 2007.157 
In September 2007, less than two months after receiving PMA 
supplement approval, Medtronic filed 120 adverse events with the Sprint 
Fidelis Lead with the FDA.158 On October 15, 2007, Medtronic announced 
a worldwide recall.159 Shortly after, the FDA issued a Class I recall, the 
most serious level of medical device recalls.160 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 151. Id. at 1203–04. 
 152. Id. at 1204. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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At the time of the recall more than 150,000 patients had been 
treated with Sprint Fidelis leads.161 It is estimated that more than eighty-
five percent of the patients receiving pacemakers and leads are sixty-five 
years or older and are thus covered under Medicare.162 Because the 
majority of the people who received the Sprint Fidelis Lead were on 
Medicare, the Medicare program has paid millions of dollars to address 
problems that patients have faced as a result of the defective Sprint 
Fidelis Leads.163 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision In re Medtronic Inc. Spring Fidelis 
Leads Products Liability Litigation absolved Medtronic, Inc. of any 
responsibility for these damages caused by its Sprint Fidelis Lead and 
externalized the costs to Medicare.164 In his actuarial analysis of the cost 
of Medtronic’s defective Sprint Fidelis Leads for pacemakers to the 
Medicare program, Dr. Dennis Tolley concluded that Medicare will pay 
up to one billion dollars in additional claims as a direct result of the 
damage caused by Medtronic placing the defective leads on the market.165  
The In re Medtronic Inc. Spring Fidelis Leads Products Liability 
Litigation case is evidence that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel 
has fully externalized the costs of device failures from medical device 
companies. The medical device companies have externalized the costs of 
medical device failures to the government and created “a very costly 
present and future liability for Medicare, Medicaid, and private health 
insurance companies.”166 
III.  The Impact of Medical Device Preemption 
With the large number of annual medical device recalls, the 
potential costs of medical device preemption on the American public are 
enormous. The FDA website lists over 160 Class I medical device recalls 
in 2009 alone.167 Although claims involving ninety percent of medical 
devices are arguably not preempted because they involve Class III medical 
devices that have been approved through the 510(k) “substantially 
equivalent process,” the majority of litigation involves the remaining ten 
percent of medical device products that may be entitled to preemption.168 
In the case of Medtronic’s defective Sprint Fidelis Leads, the immunity 
 
 161. Robert G. Hauser & David L. Hayes, Increasing Hazard of Sprint Fidelis Implantable 
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Lead Failure, 6 Heart Rhythm 605, 605 (2009). 
 162. Arshad Jahangir et al., Relation Between Mode of Pacing and Long-Term Survival in the Very 
Elderly, 33 J. Am. Coll. Cardiology 1208, 1214 (1999). 
 163. Tolley, supra note 21, at 3. 
 164. Id. at 5. 
 165. Id. at 2.  
 166. Id. at 3.  
 167. Id. at 2. 
 168. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–78 (1996). 
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from liability provided by Riegel v. Medtronic externalized an estimated 
one billion dollars worth of harm from Medtronic to the government, 
Medicare, and ultimately the American people.169 
It is important to weigh the benefits of medical device preemption 
against the significant costs associated with the act. One of the major 
goals behind the concept of medical device preemption is to promote 
medical device innovation by providing incentives for investors to fund 
the large amount of capital needed to develop medical devices.170 The 
medical device industry in the United States is a roughly $98 billion 
industry dominated by small medical device companies.171 Many small 
medical device companies face continual financial challenges, creating a 
need for third-party investors.172 
Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that 
provides tangible health benefits to the American people through the 
development of life-prolonging and life-saving devices. It reasonably 
follows that protecting small medical device companies from cumbersome 
litigation is an important way for the government to encourage medical 
device innovation. Without such protection, there is a strong likelihood 
that small medical device companies would be harmed by the high cost of 
litigation or be disincentivized from continuing in the medical device 
market. This is one of the primary reasons Congress passed the Medical 
Device Amendments in 1976. 
However, providing blanket medical device preemption externalizes 
the harm of developing defective and improperly functioning medical 
devices because medical device companies do not face the consequences 
of their actions. As evidenced by Sprint Fidelis Leads, when devices are 
provided full preemption, medical device companies have no incentive to 
vigilantly promote the safety of their products. These companies can delay 
responses and ignore claims of injury absent enforceable consequences 
 
 169. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2. 
 170. See von Spakovsky, supra note 101. 
 171. Marisa A. Trasatti et al., Preemption in Medical Device Litigation: What Has Changed Since 
Riegel?, (July 28, 2012) available at http://www.semmes.com/publications_archive/litigation/medical-
device-litigation.asp (citing Lewin Grp., Inc., State Impacts of Medical Technology Industry (June 
7, 2010)). 
 172. See, e.g., Greg Avery, MicroPhage Files for Bankruptcy Protection, Denver Bus. J., Jan. 7, 
2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2013/01/02/microphage-files-for-bankruptcy.html; 
Patricia Miller, Otologics Files for Bankruptcy, St. Louis Bus. J., July 30, 2012, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/blog/BizNext/2012/07/otologics-files-for-bankruptcy.html; Luke 
Timmerman, Archus Orthopedics, Spine Device Maker that Raised $60M, Shuts Down Amid Cash 
Crunch, Xconomy (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2009/09/03/archus-orthopedics-
spine-device-maker-that-raised-60m-shuts-down-amid-cash-crunch; Update 1-NMT Medical Says to 
Liquidate Assets, Reuters, Apr. 19, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/ 
print?aid=USL3E7FJ3SC20110419; Update 1-Xtent Board Approves Liquidation, Reuters, May 15, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=INBNG38436220090515. 
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for being irresponsible because the externalization of risks encourages 
medical device companies to take unnecessary risks. 
In the case of Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Lead, Medtronic had no 
incentive to expediently address the issues associated with the Sprint 
Fidelis because medical device preemption allowed the company to 
externalize the cost of the defect to the government to the tune of one 
billion dollars.173 Had medical preemption not existed and Medtronic 
been forced to internalize the potential costs of its product’s defects, it is 
likely that Medtronic would have acted much more quickly to address 
the problem. This would have benefitted the public, as quick action by 
Medtronic could have saved a large number of the 150,000 people174 
implanted with the Sprint Fidelis Lead from the life-threatening health 
consequences, and thousands of people from the inconvenience of having 
the Sprint Fidelis Lead device removed. Additionally, quicker action 
would have saved Medicare and the American taxpayers some of the one 
billion dollars175 that was spent to remedy problems with the Sprint 
Fidelis Lead device. 
A solution is needed that balances the need for small medical device 
manufacturers to have an incentive to innovate and forces medical device 
companies to internalize some of the costs that arise out of their defective 
devices. 
IV.  Internalizing the Externalities of Medical Device 
Preemption 
This Note proposes that the government should develop a system 
that would force medical device companies to internalize some of the 
costs of medical device defects that have been externalized as a result of 
medical device preemption. The following two-part plan attempts to 
balance the desire for more medical device innovation and force medical 
device companies to internalize some of the costs associated with defects 
in their products. 
A. Creating a “National Medical Device Injury Compensation 
Program” 
Congress should place a small tax on medical device manufacturers 
for each medical device sold. Revenue from the tax would go into a fund 
run by FDA called the “National Medical Device Injury Compensation 
Program” for the purposes of providing redress for patients who have 
been harmed by defective products. In turn, state tort claims against 
 
 173. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2. 
 174. See Hauser & Hayes, supra note 161. 
 175. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2. 
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medical device companies would be severely restricted. While this 
incrementally drives up cost of medical devices for the consumers, this 
fund simultaneously benefits consumers because the fund would be 
available to cover the harmed patients’ costs immediately. The creation 
of the National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program would 
internalize some of the costs of defects to the medical device companies. 
This solution is similar to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, which was enacted in 1986 “to encourage and improve childhood 
vaccination programs, coordinate record keeping, and standardize vaccine-
specific warnings.”176 An amendment to the act created the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“NVICP”).177 One of the main 
purposes of the NVICP was “to safeguard the nation’s supply of vaccines 
by insulating manufacturers from liability claims and to provide prompt 
and adequate compensation for victims of unpreventable adverse effects 
of vaccination.”178 
To accomplish this goal, the government implemented a no-fault 
government compensation program to limit the damages that individuals 
who suffered injuries attributed to vaccinations may collect.179 The 
compensation plan was funded by a vaccine excise tax:180 Individuals 
receiving the vaccine were charged a small tax starting at seventy-five 
cents per vaccine dose.181 The largest per dose charge was for diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis (“DTP”) vaccinations.182 DTP doses were taxed at a 
rate of $2.25 per dose, or approximately fifteen percent of the wholesale 
cost of vaccine.183 
The NVICP was the first national industry-wide effort at creating a 
no-fault strict product liability scheme that balanced the need for 
innovation from vaccine manufacturers and the rights of consumers.184 
This model has been proposed as an example for insuring other products 
or services like pharmaceuticals or medical care.185 Since the NVICP’s 
implementation, instances of large vaccine injury awards have been 
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eliminated.186 This was not the trend before the implementation of the 
NVICP.187 The NVICP’s success “in protecting both manufacturers and 
consumers is certain to attract the attention of legislators anxious to 
protect other commercial interests, to promote consumers’ chances of 
compensation after injury, or simply to combat the public perception of 
tort law as a system out of control.”188 
Similarly, the FDA should develop a “National Medical Device 
Injury Compensation Program” modeled after the NVICP. The NVICP 
was successful at balancing protection of manufacturers with the patients’ 
right to compensation. Like the NVICP, the National Medical Device 
Injury Compensation Program would successfully balance costs of faulty 
medical device companies through small surcharges on their products and 
preserve the ability of medical device companies to innovate. The key to 
the success of a potential tax would be to set the tax rate at a level high 
enough to fulfill the redress requirements of the patient who has been hurt 
by the medical device, but low enough to not stifle medical innovation. 
B. Medical Device Companies Should Be Required to Insure 
Against Possible Defects 
Under the second part of the plan, Congress should revise medical 
device preemption and pass new legislation that requires medical device 
companies to purchase insurance that protects the companies from state 
tort claims based on defective products. This should be required for each 
new device brought to market by medical device companies. Such a 
requirement would also provide a remedy for individuals who have been 
harmed by defective medical devices. Additionally, the insurance 
requirement would preserve medical device companies’ ability to innovate 
while providing redress for those who have been harmed by faulty devices. 
This solution, implemented concurrently with the National Medical Device 
Injury Compensation Fund, will provide some remedy for patients harmed 
by medical devices. 
The type of insurance required should be similar to the stop-loss 
insurance that is used by many companies for their ERISA liabilities. 
Stop-loss insurance allows companies to protect themselves from the 
costs associated with major losses.189 There are two main types of stop-
loss insurance.190 Specific stop-loss insurance covers against the risk that 
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the insurance purchaser’s claims will exceed a certain threshold.191 “For 
example, if the insurance kicks in when an individual’s claims exceed 
$20,000 per year and a participant has claims of $30,000, the plan’s stop-
loss insurer covers $10,000 of the person’s claims.”192 The other type of 
stop-loss insurance is aggregate stop-loss insurance, which covers the 
insured party against the risk that the sum of all claims against it will 
exceed a certain threshold.193 “For example, if the insurance kicks in when 
aggregate claims exceed $2 million per year and claims under the plan total 
$2.5 million, the stop-loss insurer covers $500,000 of the claims.”194 
Companies should be required to purchase one of these two types of stop-
loss insurance. 
To account for the differing sizes of medical device companies, the 
amount of coverage required should depend both on the financial size of 
the company and the potential size of the device’s market. The insurance 
requirements should become part of the FDA’s premarket approval process. 
The purpose of insurance is to protect risk adverse groups from 
suffering the full consequences of non-foreseeable actions that affect 
them unfavorably.195 Requiring medical device companies to purchase 
insurance would internalize some of the external costs of defective 
products to the medical device company. Medical device companies 
would pay a premium to spread the potential costs of defective products 
to the entire medical device industry. Insurance premiums are dependent 
on the level of risk posed by the companies being insured. An insurance 
requirement would encourage medical device companies to minimize 
their own risks because companies with a history of safer devices would 
be charged lower premiums than companies with a history of producing 
defective devices. Thus, such a requirement would encourage medical 
device companies to minimize the harms caused by their devices. 
Currently, under medical device preemption, the entire cost of the 
defects is externalized from medical device companies to consumers, 
private insurers, Medicare, and the government. Under the insurance 
requirement, the costs would be internalized by the medical device 
industry and spread throughout the entire medical device industry. An 
insurance requirement, while increasing the costs of medical device 
companies, would not cost the companies as much as the complete 
removal of the medical device preemption. Together, these two 
proposals would internalize some of the costs of medical device defects 
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without subjecting medical device companies to litigation that could 
curtail innovation. 
Conclusion 
Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that 
benefits the American public. Protecting small medical device companies 
from unnecessary litigation is an important way for the government to 
achieve this goal. Providing blank medical device preemption is not the 
solution because it enables medical device companies to externalize the 
harms caused by their devices. 
To solve this conundrum, Congress must develop a system that 
internalizes some of the costs of medical device preemption. Such a 
requirement would encourage medical device companies to take fewer 
risks and promote medical device safety without stifling medical 
innovation. This can be achieved by forcing medical device companies to 
participate in an industry-wide insurance system and imposing a small tax 
to fund the cost of possible defects. The plan proposed by this Note 
would provide harmed patients with an avenue to remedy the harms that 
they have suffered, promote medical device safety, and allow medical 
device companies to continue to develop life-enhancing products. 
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